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Notes 
OF TREATIES AND TORTURE: 
HOW THE SUPREME COURT CAN 
RESTRAIN THE EXECUTIVE 
JEFFREY C. GOLDMAN 
INTRODUCTION1 
The Bush administration’s original (and now superseded) 
“torture memos” strain contemporary understandings of the United 
States’ obligations under the Convention Against Torture.2 These 
documents also mock traditional understandings of the relationship 
between international law and treaties and of the executive’s power 
to interpret and apply them.3 Perhaps most alarming are the 
administration’s attempts to undermine the spirit of both domestic 
legislation and international law by employing a “strict 
constructionist” interpretive methodology while embracing an 
expansive view of executive power. The Bush administration’s 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Jeffrey C. Goldman. 
 1. The topic for this Note was inspired by an article written by Professors Derek Jinks and 
David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 
(2004), which concludes, in answer to its title, that the president is so bound. 
 2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S 85 (entered into 
force June 26, 1987; entered into force for the United States Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter 
Convention Against Torture]. 
 3. See Memorandum re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, 
from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney 
General 2 (Dec. 30, 2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (superseding the 
August 2002 memorandum, interpreting the definition of torture, and reiterating “the 
President’s unequivocal directive that U.S. personnel not engage in torture”); Memorandum re: 
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, from Jay S. Bybee, 
Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 1–2 (Aug. 1, 
2002) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogation 
memo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Standards of Conduct for Interrogation] (expounding the 
criminal definition of torture and concluding that torture may be permitted in the War on 
Terror under the president’s war-conducting authority or justified by necessity). 
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approach weakens American law’s carefully constructed system of 
checks and balances by aggrandizing power to the executive branch at 
the expense of both coordinate branches. 
Short of impeaching the president and removing him from 
office—a drastic step that is likely to be both politically unpopular 
and ineffective in restoring the country’s reputation as a leader in 
human rights issues—what other avenues exist for restraining the 
executive? This Note argues that the Supreme Court should take a far 
more activist approach in reviewing executive interpretation of 
international law and that it may do so while remaining consistent 
with judicial precedent. In particular, this Note focuses on the 
administration’s conduct of the War on Terror and specifically on its 
application of, or threats to use, torture. It concludes that the 
president does not, in fact, have the power to terminate unilaterally 
the Convention Against Torture because treaties that embody human 
rights norms (especially peremptory norms like torture) are 
fundamentally different from other sorts of treaties.4 
The interplay of traditional and contemporary understandings of 
international law—especially customary international law and 
peremptory norms—combined with well-established interpretations 
of the treaty power suggest that the balance of power between the 
executive and judicial branches should vary with the subject matter of 
a treaty. True, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit did state, in Goldwater v. Carter,5 that “[t]here is no 
judicially ascertainable and manageable method of making any 
distinction among treaties on the basis of their substance.”6 However, 
the development of international humanitarian and human rights law 
in the twentieth century, and especially in the twenty-five years since 
Goldwater was decided, suggests otherwise. 
The recognition of some rules of international law as peremptory 
norms from which no derogation is permitted (jus cogens) provides a 
“judicially ascertainable and manageable method”7 of distinguishing 
treaties based on subject matter. These treaties provide the Supreme 
 
 4. As an aside, the arguments advanced in this Note would likely also apply to 
presidential statements purporting to interpret legislation implementing human rights treaties. 
Such application, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 5. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 6. See id. at 707 (concluding that the president could unilaterally terminate the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in accordance with the treaty’s terms). 
 7. Id. 
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Court with legitimate, constitutional reasons to overrule 
congressional and executive treaty interpretations. Although U.S. 
courts long ago adopted a rule of construction that accorded treaties 
and statutes equal weight,8 jurists added a caveat: “[u]nless it is for 
some reason distinguishable from other laws, the rule which [a treaty] 
gives may be displaced by the legislative power, at its pleasure.”9 
Treaties dealing with peremptory norms are categorically 
different from other treaties. Human rights treaties, and related 
implementing legislation, grant specific and far-reaching rights 
directly to individuals. These rights, by virtue of reason, should be 
held by courts as equal to constitutional freedoms and rights; like 
those freedoms and rights, neither the executive nor the legislative 
branch should be able to alter or infringe them in any but the most 
compelling circumstances (and certainly not unilaterally, as by 
executive order). The Supreme Court’s recognition of this 
equivalence would give it an axe to wield that it cannot carry into 
interpretative battles regarding other treaties.10 This axe can restore 
the balance of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches and ensure that the United States, which has led the world 
in recognizing and promoting human rights, retains its high moral 
ground. 
This Note argues that because human rights are fundamental in 
nature, and because the exercise of constitutional rights is predicated 
on the enjoyment of more basic human rights, courts should treat 
human rights treaties differently than other international agreements 
the United States has signed or ratified. Part I of this Note reviews 
the judiciary’s understanding of the relationship between 
 
 8. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (holding 
that a congressional act granting preferences on hemp imported from India superseded a treaty 
granting most-favored-nation status to Russia because “[t]here is . . . nothing in the mere fact 
that a treaty is a law, which would prevent congress from repealing it”); see also Chew Heong v. 
United States, 112 U.S. 536, 547–50 (1884) (discussing Congress’s power to override a treaty 
with legislation, but disfavoring implied abrogation of treaties); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(1)(a) (1987) (“An act of Congress supersedes . . . a provision of an 
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the 
earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly 
reconciled.”). 
 9. Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785 (emphasis added). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power “[t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); 
Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785 (“Ordinarily, treaties are not rules prescribed by sovereigns for the 
conduct of their subjects, but contracts, by which they agree to regulate their own conduct.”). 
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international and domestic law. It then presents a brief overview of 
jus cogens norms in international law and demonstrates that torture 
has entered the canon of such norms. Part II begins with a discussion 
of the function and interpretation of treaties under U.S. law and 
argues that human rights treaties should be categorically 
distinguished from those dealing with other subjects. It then argues 
that equating human rights with constitutional rights is both 
appropriate and necessary if human rights treaties are to achieve their 
full potential. Part III suggests a limit for the executive’s treaty 
interpretation power and specifically demonstrates that executive 
power to terminate treaties unilaterally does not extend to human 
rights treaties. Part III then argues that recognizing human rights 
treaties as a distinct category offers the judiciary a way to restrain the 
executive without running afoul of the political question doctrine. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEREMPTORY NORMS, AND TORTURE 
This Part examines the relationship between international law, 
peremptory norms, and torture. Section A describes the history of 
U.S. courts’ recognition of international law and the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the relationship between domestic and international 
law. Section B defines jus cogens (peremptory) norms and their place 
in the international law hierarchy and establishes torture as a jus 
cogens norm. 
A. Recognition of International Law by U.S. Courts 
International law “consists of rules and principles of general 
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international 
organizations and with their relations . . . [including] some of their 
relations with persons.”11 These rules are derived from treaties, 
customs, and principles common to major world legal systems.12 This 
definition, however, does not explain how U.S. courts have 
traditionally treated international law in general, and customary 
international law and jus cogens specifically. This Section briefly 
describes U.S. jurisprudence regarding international law. 
 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 101 (1987); see also Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm (delineating a 
commonly accepted list of major sources of international law). 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (1987). 
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The Framers assumed that the American government would be 
based on a common law legal system similar to England’s.13 
According to Professor Michael Glennon, because the English law 
embraced principles of both natural and international law, the 
Framers intended that the U.S. legal system would embrace these 
same principles.14 Courts have generally reached a similar conclusion. 
An early case supporting this contention is The Paquete Habana,15 
which dealt with whether fishing boats caught during the Spanish-
American War should be exempt from capture as a prize of war.16 
Speaking for a six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court, Justice 
Gray first noted that “[b]y an ancient usage among civilized nations, 
beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of 
international law,” boats captured in the course of fishing were 
exempt from capture.17 After a comprehensive review of the rule’s 
history, including a review of English and French law, Justice Gray 
declared that this rule “has been familiar to the United States from 
the time of the War of Independence.”18 Recounting adherence to the 
rule in the “modern” era19 (including by Japan, described as “the last 
State admitted into the rank of civilized nations”), Justice Gray 
wrote: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . . . 
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to 
the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, 
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.20 
 
 13. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 252 (1990) (“As the 
Framers met in Philadelphia to draft the Constitution, they worked against the backdrop of an 
American common-law system that had borrowed heavily from that of the English.”). 
 14. Id. at 251–58 (using case law, English heritage and incorporation, and constitutional 
principles to conclude that customary international law is part of U.S. law). 
 15. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 16. Id. at 686. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 689. 
 19. Id. at 689–701. 
 20. Id. at 700. 
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Concluding that a court21 “administering the law of nations” must, in 
the absence of a treaty on the same subject, judicially discern and 
apply international law, the court found in favor of the ship owners.22 
Interestingly, the dissent in The Paquete Habana did not deny 
the existence of the international rule cited by the majority. Instead, it 
disputed the force of the rule, downgrading it from a law to a mere 
matter of comity between nations, “an act of grace, and not a matter 
of right.”23 The dissent, however, misconstrued the Court’s earlier 
opinion in Brown v. United States,24 on which it relied.25 Contrary to 
the dissent’s reading, in Brown, which dealt with confiscation of 
enemy property during the War of 1812, Chief Justice Marshall 
questioned only the legitimacy and implications of a specific rule of 
international law, but did not deny the persuasive authority of 
international law in general.26 In fact, the Chief Justice did not 
abandon the notion of international law’s persuasive authority on 
U.S. courts at all. Earlier in the Brown opinion, he cited international 
law for the proposition that “tangible property belonging to an enemy 
and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to 
be immediately confiscated.”27 Marshall also warned the Court 
against interpreting the Constitution to permit what would be 
generally prohibited under international law.28 
More than one hundred years later, U.S. courts are still citing 
The Paquete Habana. For example, a federal district court recently 
cited the case when holding that the court could “not ignore the 
 
 21. Technically, the case referred to prize courts, which specifically dealt with the 
(wartime) capture of a ship and its cargo at sea. 
 22. Id. at 708, 711–12, 714 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (reversing the lower court’s decision 
that the ships be treated as prizes of war). 
 23. See id. at 715, 719 (declining to find any such rule of international law and arguing that 
international law has no power in itself but rather provides a guide for a nation’s sovereign 
power). 
 24. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814). 
 25. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 715–16 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); see Brown, 12 U.S. (8 
Cranch) at 122–23 (discussing whether a declaration of war automatically confiscates enemy 
property or merely gives the sovereign the right to do so). 
 26. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128–29 (holding that international law does not by its 
own force authorize confiscation of enemy property in a time of war but rather gives the 
sovereign the right to do so). 
 27. Id. at 125. 
 28. See id. (“In expounding that constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be 
admitted which would give to a declaration of war an effect in this country it does not possess 
elsewhere.”). 
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precepts of customary international law.”29 Indeed, even the 
conservative Rehnquist Court acknowledged that “the domestic law 
of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”30 The next Section 
of this Note turns to the concept of jus cogens norms—norms 
considered to be uniformly binding under international law—and 
demonstrates that torture has achieved jus cogens status. 
B. Jus Cogens Norms and Torture 
Certain norms under international law are deemed to be jus 
cogens, or “[c]ompelling law which is binding on parties regardless of 
their will and [that does] not yield to other laws.”31 As such, jus cogens 
norms should be, and usually are, accorded greater protection than 
other rights. A norm cannot be jus cogens unless both the principle 
and its universal, binding character are accepted by the international 
community.32 Although there is some disagreement at the margins, 
prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and apartheid are generally 
conceded to be examples of jus cogens norms.33 Torture is recognized 
as such a jus cogens norm under both international and U.S. domestic 
law.34 Torture is prohibited in all major legal systems and by almost all 
international human rights instruments.35 
 
 29. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reconciling customary 
international law and the Immigration and Nationality Act in evaluating a writ for habeas 
corpus), rev’d sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 30. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (limiting application of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), to a narrow set of claims arising under international law 
that does not include a right to be free of arbitrary detention). 
 31. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 54 & n.54 
(Comm. Print 2001). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 55; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. k (1987) 
(“Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community as 
peremptory, permitting no derogation.”). 
 34. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. n. The Restatement 
includes the prohibition against “torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment” as a customary international law of human rights and notes that although not all 
customary human rights norms constitute jus cogens, torture does. Id.; see also Convention 
Against Torture, supra note 2. 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 reporter’s note 5 (listing 
human rights conventions prohibiting torture and noting that “torture as punishment is barred 
by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, and [that] confessions of crime obtained by 
torture are excluded” by the Fifth Amendment). 
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Domestically, the U.S. Senate acknowledged that torture is 
prohibited under international law when it gave its advice and 
consent to ratifying the Convention Against Torture.36 The Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations described the Convention as a 
codification of international law and indicated that “[r]atification . . . 
[would] demonstrate clearly and unequivocally U.S. opposition to 
torture.”37 The Committee believed ratification was “consistent with 
long-standing U.S. efforts to promote and protect basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms throughout the world.”38 The Committee’s 
comments also suggested that regardless of torture’s peremptory-
norm status at the time of the hearing, most of the obligations the 
United States assumed when acceding to the Convention were 
“already covered by existing law.”39 
At the Senate hearing, substantial evidence was presented that 
the Convention Against Torture recognized, rather than created, 
international law. For example, Judge Abraham D. Sofaer indicated 
that “[i]nternational law already condemns torture[, and i]n that 
sense, the Convention breaks little new ground.”40 Testimony before 
the Committee also acknowledged that the United States was the 
only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council not to have 
ratified the Convention.41 
Furthermore, U.S. courts have also recognized torture as a 
peremptory norm and not just as a domestically legislated 
prohibition. In the seminal case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,42 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “deliberate 
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates 
universally accepted norms of the international law of human 
 
 36. Convention Against Torture, supra note 2. The Senate’s acknowledgement is not, of 
course, conclusive evidence that torture has obtained jus cogens status. 
 37. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. 
EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE REPORT]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st 
Cong. 7 (1990) (statement of J. Abraham D. Sofaer, legal adviser, U.S. Department of State). 
 41. Id. at 45 (reprinting the statement of Winston Nagan, chairman, board of directors, 
Amnesty International USA). 
 42. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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rights.”43 Recognizing that “courts must interpret international law 
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists . . . today,” the 
court acknowledged that there were “few, if any, issues in 
international law . . . on which opinion seems to be so united as the 
limitations on a state’s power to torture.”44 And, in discussing whether 
the United Nations Charter conveyed individual rights to citizens of 
member countries, the court added that “the guaranties include, at a 
bare minimum, the right to be free from torture.”45 Interestingly, 
Filartiga was decided almost fifteen years prior to the United States’ 
accession to the Convention Against Torture, supporting the 
contention that torture had already achieved the status of a 
peremptory, binding norm prior to the Convention.46 
As a jus cogens norm, torture deserves greater protection than 
other rights—perhaps even greater protection than other 
constitutional rights. As discussed in Part II, this heightened 
protection suggests a way to distinguish treaties by subject matter. 
II.  DISTINGUISHING HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
The previous Part established that the U.S. is bound by 
international law and that torture is widely recognized as a jus cogens 
norm under international law. This Part discusses the relationship 
between international and domestic law, focusing on treaties, which 
bridge the two legal planes. Section A examines the concept of 
treaties and seeks to distinguish between those treaties that are 
contractual in nature and those that reflect international law, focusing 
on differentiating treaties dealing with international human rights 
 
 43. Id. at 878; see id. (finding a right of action in U.S. courts under the Alien’s Action for 
Tort (Alien Tort Statute), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, for Paraguayan citizens when their alleged torturer 
was physically present in the United States); see also Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 
2d 1244, 1255–56 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (acknowledging that U.S. courts have found torture to be a 
jus cogens norm but declining to find a private right of action based on it); GLENNON, supra 
note 13, at 265–66 (quoting Filartiga and commenting that the prohibition against torture was 
found to be a settled rule of international law and a peremptory norm). 
 44. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
 45. See id. at 882 (providing evidence of the guarantee of freedom from torture as defined 
under several multilateral international human rights agreements). 
 46. See id. at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate 
and slave trader . . . an enemy of all mankind.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS § 702(d) (1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it 
practices, encourages or condones . . . torture . . . .”); id. reporter’s note 11 (stating that 
prohibition of torture is a nonderogable jus cogens norm under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights). 
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law. Section A also reviews U.S. courts’ traditional understanding of 
treaties and the relationship between treaties, international law, and 
domestic law. Section B equates the substantive rights delineated in 
human rights treaties, especially jus cogens norms, with constitutional 
rights. 
At the outset, the looming presence of Goldwater v. Carter47 
should be acknowledged. In Goldwater, a plurality of the Court held 
that a challenge to President Carter’s unilateral termination of a 
commercial treaty with Taiwan was a nonjusticiable political 
question.48 Although Goldwater has precedential value, its reasoning 
should apply only to certain types of treaties. Specifically, this Note 
argues that Goldwater’s nonjusticiability rule should apply only to 
commercial treaties and should not apply to human rights treaties. As 
this Note explains in Section A and further develops in Part III.A, 
commercial and human rights treaties can be distinguished on the 
basis of purpose (contractual vs. codification) and subject matter 
(commercial vs. human rights). These distinctions are crucial in 
determining whether nonjusticiability should apply. 
A. Methods for Distinguishing Treaties 
A treaty is “[a]n agreement formally signed, ratified, or adhered 
to between two nations or sovereigns; an international agreement 
concluded between two or more states in written form and governed 
by international law.”49 A treaty is, essentially, a “contract between 
nations” and is usually treated like a contract rather than a legislative 
act.50 Madison commented that “[t]he object of treaties is the 
regulation of intercourse with foreign nations and is external.”51 
 
 47. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 48. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). 
 49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1540 (8th ed. 2004). For purposes of this Note, “treaty” 
will generally refer to any international agreement entered into by the United States and will 
not be limited to those agreements executed under the president’s Article II authority. See, e.g., 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(defining a treaty as an international agreement between states, “whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”); B. 
Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (holding as a treaty, for jurisdictional 
purposes, “a compact authorized by the Congress . . . [and] negotiated and proclaimed” by the 
president). 
 50. 87 C.J.S. Treaties § 2 (2000). 
 51. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 41 
(1915) (quoting James Madison at the Virginia Convention of 1788 called to ratify the 
Constitution). 
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However, although treaties often resemble contracts in form, they can 
sometimes perform statutory or legislative functions.52 Such is the case 
in the United States, where treaties are considered to be the law of 
the land.53 Both contractual and lawmaking treaties are, in general, 
considered sources of international law; neither international nor U.S. 
domestic law, however, accords all laws equal standing.54 For 
example, the consequence of breaching a contract (damages) is quite 
different from the consequence for breaking a law (often, 
incarceration). In the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. 
international agreements typically focused on economic, 
transportation-communication, cultural-technical, diplomatic, and 
military issues.55 
Historically, U.S. courts have interpreted treaties “in the manner 
and to the extent [to] which the parties have declared, and not 
otherwise.”56 The Supreme Court has no power “to alter, amend, or 
add to any treaty, by inserting any clause” because that “would be to 
make, and not to construe a treaty.”57 Treaties generally are deemed 
to have the same weight as federal law but are not superior to the 
Constitution.58 
The remainder of this Section describes the traditional 
classification scheme for treaties and suggests an alternate 
methodology. The Section concludes by asserting that human rights 
treaties can be clearly distinguished from other treaties based on their 
subject matter and applies the proposed methodology to prove the 
argument. Some treaties that seek to achieve multiple objectives or 
that take a comprehensive approach to problem-solving might be 
difficult to classify, but this Note is not concerned with such 
borderline cases. The classification scheme described in this Note will 
 
 52. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 37 (7th rev. ed., 1997) (noting that treaties “can also perform functions . . . carried out by 
statutes [or] by conveyances”). 
 53. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (requiring that treaties, federal law, and the Constitution 
be treated as the “supreme law of the land”); see also 87 C.J.S. Treaties § 2 (2000) (same). 
 54. MALANCZUK, supra note 52, at 38. But see id. at 37–38 (noting that some scholars 
believe that only “law-making” treaties should be considered sources of international law and 
that “contract-treaties” are not sources of law but merely legal transactions). 
 55. See LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 16 (1984) 
(charting U.S. international agreements from 1946 to 1972 by subject-matter category). 
 56. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 72 (1821) (interpreting a treaty dealing with ships 
captured as war prizes). 
 57. Id. at 71. 
 58. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884). 
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distinguish the majority of treaties—and can be applied easily to the 
Convention Against Torture and most other human rights treaties. 
1. Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Treaties.  Article II 
treaties—those negotiated by the president and ratified by the 
Senate—are sometimes said to have the force of law only once they 
are executed. A treaty can be either self-executing—meaning it has 
the force of law once ratified—or non-self-executing—meaning 
separate “implementing legislation” must be passed before the treaty 
has force.59 Chief Justice Marshall elegantly explained that a treaty 
“is . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any 
legislative provision.”60 At times, distinguishing a self-executing treaty 
from one that is not self-executing can be difficult. A four-part test is 
often used to distinguish the two, focusing on: (1) the purpose and 
objectives of the treaty; (2) the existence of domestic procedures for 
direct implementation; (3) the availability of alternative enforcement 
mechanisms; and (4) the social consequences flowing from a court’s 
decision whether the treaty is self-executing.61 
When no implementing legislation has been passed, non-self-
executing treaties do not create a private right of action under which 
a plaintiff can state a claim.62 To avoid infringing on the political 
branches’ authority to define crimes and to conduct foreign relations, 
courts have invoked non-self-execution to deny claims under 
international human rights treaties ratified by the United States.63 
Ostensibly, courts’ construction and delineation of treaties in this 
fashion serves the purpose of deferring as much as possible to the 
express will of the legislative branch and to the executive’s 
interpretations of statutes and international commitments. 
Yet, it is not at all clear that the self-executing and non-self-
executing dichotomy was intended to apply to international 
 
 59. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 593 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (reviewing U.S. treaty 
obligations and claims arising under treaties and other forms of international law). 
 60. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
 61. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 62. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassini, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999) 
(holding the Convention Against Torture to be non-self-executing, and thus concluding that it 
created no private right of action). 
 63. See id. (holding that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not self-executing 
and, further, is not intended to be legally binding but rather to be merely evidence of existing 
customary international law). 
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agreements dealing with subjects like human rights. Although Chief 
Justice Marshall’s comments in Foster v. Neilson64 are the source of 
this dichotomy, those comments may have been intended to apply 
only to “contractual” treaties.65 Marshall stated that “when either of 
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses 
itself to the political . . . department; and the legislature must execute 
the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”66 Although 
Marshall emphasized that an international agreement remains 
inchoate until enacted by Congress, he prefaced that statement with 
the phrase “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract.”67 
Foster involved two claimants to the same tract of land: one traced 
ownership to a grant when the land was under Spanish possession; the 
other to a grant once the land came under U.S. control.68 The former 
claimed that the United States was bound by treaty to honor Spain’s 
grant to the title holder.69 Marshall parsed the treaty’s language, 
holding that it did not automatically confer property rights on those 
who received grants when the land was under Spanish control; rather, 
such grants were only valid once confirmed by Congress.70 
Chief Justice Marshall, ever the savvy diplomat, primarily sought 
to avoid a dispute with the political branches that might have been 
caused by the Court’s support for a foreign nation.71 Adopting a treaty 
 
 64. 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
 65. Id. at 314. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. Marshall wrote: 
  A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It 
does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as 
its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power 
of the respective parties to the instrument. 
  In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares 
a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of 
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without 
the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a 
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty 
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must 
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court. 
Id. 
 68. Id. at 299. 
 69. Id. at 304–05. 
 70. Id. at 315. 
 71. Marshall wrote: 
  After these acts of sovereign [American] power over the [Spanish] territory in 
dispute, asserting the American construction of the treaty by which the government 
claims it, to maintain the opposite construction in its own courts would certainly be an 
anomaly in the history and practice of nations. If those departments which are 
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construction that would invalidate actions the federal government 
had taken in reliance on a claim of sovereignty over the territory in 
question would have been “an anomaly in the history and practice of 
nations.”72 Marshall’s decision strengthened the early republic by 
consolidating control over what would eventually become a 
significant portion of the United States73—and possibly anticipated 
and enabled the Manifest Destiny movement which would flourish in 
the 1840s.74 
Marshall’s distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties, then, might not reflect an overarching judicial 
philosophy so much as a convenient fix for exigent circumstances.75 
Indeed, the Court itself has on occasion rejected Marshall’s 
dichotomy. For example, in the Head Money Cases,76 the Court 
distinguished between contractual treaties, which conferred no 
individual rights, and statutory treaties, which did.77 The Head Money 
Cases dealt with the validity of an excise tax on immigrants—a tax 
 
entrusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation . . . have unequivocally asserted 
its rights of dominion over a country of which it is in possession, and which it claims 
under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not in 
its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A question like this respecting 
the boundaries of nations, is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal 
question . . . . 
Id. at 309. Note that the treaty in question is of a contractual, rather than a lawmaking type, 
dealing as it does with possession of land—which is immediately recognizable as a real property 
transaction. 
 72. Id. (“If those departments which are entrusted with the foreign intercourse of the 
nation . . . have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a . . . possession . . . it is not in 
its own courts that [a treaty interpretation taken by the political branches] is to be denied.”). 
 73. Marshall reached a similar decision, on similar grounds, in the earlier case of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), in which he held a property claim raised by Indians 
invalid because their land was “discovered” by Europeans and “if an uninhabited country be 
discovered . . . the country becomes the property of the discoverers,” id. at 595. 
 74. Manifest Destiny was a nineteenth-century concept that presumed that “the United 
States had the right and duty to expand throughout North America.” THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 825 (3d ed. 1993). 
 75. That Marshall’s judicial approach was pragmatic is not particularly controversial. See, 
e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall’s Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 439, 445 
(describing and analyzing Marshall’s adjudicative style). As Professor Eisgruber comments: 
John Marshall faced the task of demonstrating that crucial and difficult constitutional 
questions could be resolved without leaving American politics subject to the 
undisciplined play of either legislative or judicial discretion. An important part of 
Marshall’s response was tactical . . . . Marshall aggressively took advantage of political 
circumstances to deflect attacks upon the Court and to secure useful precedents. 
Id. 
 76. 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 77. Id. at 598–99. 
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that the plaintiffs claimed conflicted with various bilateral treaties.78 
The Court distinguished between treaties that are merely “compact[s] 
between independent nations,” under which courts can provide no 
remedy to an injured party, and those that “confer certain rights upon 
the citizens” of one party living in the territory of another, which are 
“capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts.”79 
Thus, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties, although long-standing, is not compelled in all instances; 
other treaty classification schemes are possible and, indeed, have 
been relied on by courts. 
2. Subject Matter.  If the structure of a treaty—its nature as a 
self-executing or non-self-executing instrument—is an inappropriate 
basis for determining when a treaty functions as a law and not as a 
contract (a distinction critical to knowing how a court should 
interpret its breach), what might be a better way to distinguish the 
two? The treaty’s subject matter may offer a more useful basis for 
distinction.80 Chief Justice Marshall’s dichotomy may be useful for 
determining when treaties incidentally or derivatively confer 
individual rights, such as “treaties of peace, commerce, [and] 
alliance,”81 but only because the essential nature of such treaties is 
already obvious (they are contractual). Individual rights are not 
necessarily essential to the achievement of these treaties’ aims, and 
thus whether such rights are conferred by these treaties is not of 
primary importance. The situation, however, is very different with 
human rights treaties, which primarily and specifically seek to 
acknowledge or imbue individual rights. Analyzing such a treaty as 
self-executing (or not) might be academically interesting, but this 
approach misses the forest for the trees. An approach that first 
considers subject matter would, this Note proposes, be both more 
efficient and more effective. 
Chief Justice Marshall, however, was not alone in his conception 
of the treaty power’s scope and nature. Alexander Hamilton, for 
example, believed that treaties had, as their object, contracts with 
 
 78. Id. at 597. 
 79. See id. at 597–99 (concluding that even when a treaty provided private rights such as 
those of property or inheritance, an act of Congress that contravened the treaty controlled). 
 80. MALANCZUK, supra note 52, at 38 (noting that “the only distinction between a law-
making treaty and a contract treaty” is one of content). 
 81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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foreign nations, and that they did not encompass “rules prescribed by 
the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and 
sovereign.”82 A jurist who was a contemporary of the Framers 
commented, “The power ‘to make treaties’ . . . embraces all sorts of 
treaties, for peace or war; for commerce or territory; for alliances or 
succors . . . and for any other purposes which the policy or interests of 
independent sovereigns may dictate in their intercourse with each 
other.”83 Another jurist opined that “[o]rdinarily, treaties are not 
rules prescribed by sovereigns for the conduct of their subjects, but 
contracts, by which [the sovereigns] agree to regulate their own 
conduct.”84 He applied this rationale to hold that congressional 
legislation superseded a commercial treaty when a conflict arose 
between the two, despite the fact that individual merchants were 
inconvenienced by the change.85 However, he qualified this rule of 
construction with the caveat that it might be inapplicable when a 
treaty is distinguishable from other laws—perhaps alluding to 
situations that do in fact prescribe conduct for sovereigns’ subjects.86 
Theoretical reinterpretations of history are one thing, but actual 
precedent is far more compelling. The Supreme Court itself has, in 
fact, distinguished a treaty based on subject matter.87 In United States 
v. Rauscher,88 the Court interpreted the Ashburton Treaty to hold 
that British defendants extradited to the United States could only be 
tried for crimes enumerated in the demand for extradition.89 Of 
course, an extradition treaty might not be classified as a human rights 
treaty by modern standards. Rauscher, however, is notable for 
 
 82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 81, at 450–51. 
 83. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 1502 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833), quoted in HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 41 (1915). 
 84. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (Curtis, J.) 
(holding that Congress may repeal a treaty by enacting relevant legislation). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (“There is therefore nothing in the mere fact that a treaty is a law, which would 
prevent congress from repealing it. Unless it is for some reason distinguishable from other laws, 
the rule which it gives may be displaced by the legislative power, at its pleasure.”). 
 87. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412 (1886) (“Whether in the United 
States, in the absence of any treaty on the subject . . . a State can, through its own judiciary or 
executive, surrender him for trial to such foreign nation is a question which has been under 
consideration by the courts of this country without any very conclusive result.”). 
 88. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
 89. Id. at 409. 
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acknowledging that a treaty’s subject matter, and not its self-
executing nature, granted individual rights.90 
Rauscher is not the only example of the Supreme Court 
distinguishing treaties based on subject-matter classification. For 
example, in considering whether certain provisions of the Jay Treaty 
of 1794 between the United States and the United Kingdom survived 
the War of 1812, the Court unanimously held: “The doctrine . . . that 
war ipso facto annuls treaties of every kind . . . is repudiated by the 
great weight of modern authority; and the view now commonly 
accepted is that ‘whether the stipulations of a treaty are annulled by 
war depends upon their intrinsic character.’”91 Specifically, the Court 
distinguished treaties “having a political character” from those 
dealing with substantive issues, such as possession of property by 
nationals, boundary decisions, and “provisions which represent 
completed acts.”92 The Court ultimately distinguished treaty articles 
vesting rights “permanent in character” which were “by their very 
nature . . . fixed and continuing” from those rights which were 
“wholly promissory and prospective.”93 
3. Human Rights Treaties and the Subject-Matter Distinction.  
Applying the distinction between treaties vesting personal and 
permanent rights (human rights treaties) and promissory rights 
(contractual agreements) to the Goldwater holding, a commercial 
treaty (like that in Goldwater) might confer derivative individual 
rights, but a human rights treaty clearly implicates rights “permanent 
in character.”94 Whereas nations might contract for certain privileges 
in a commercial treaty, such that the parties merit the benefits of their 
 
 90. Id. at 419. The Court cites the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884), as 
precedent for this analysis. In the Head Money Cases, the Court held that 
[a] treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions 
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be 
determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, 
that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would 
to a statute. 
112 U.S. at 598–99. 
 91. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236 (1929) (quoting 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 
A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 (1906)). 
 92. Id. at 236–37. 
 93. Id. at 239; see also Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (holding international commercial agreements such as NAFTA nonjusticiable on the 
ground that the Constitution clearly delegates authority over “foreign affairs and commerce” to 
the political branches). 
 94. Karnuth, 279 U.S. at 239. 
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bargains, to speak of treaties as creating bargained-for privileges of 
human beings seems offensive.95 Unfortunately, in modern times, 
courts have generally relied on Chief Justice Marshall’s dichotomy 
rather than the substance of treaties to determine whether treaties 
create individual rights. Sadly for both human rights activists and 
potential torture victims, Marshall’s dichotomy quite often has been 
applied to human rights treaties. For example, a district court held 
that the United Nations Charter was non-self-executing and therefore 
did “not vest any of the plaintiffs with individual legal rights.”96 
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)97 has been found to be non-self-executing.98 Specifically 
because of their non-self-executing nature, neither the ICCPR nor the 
Convention Against Torture were deemed to have created “a private 
right of action under which the plaintiff[s could] successfully state a 
claim.”99 
In applying Marshall’s dichotomy to human rights treaties, courts 
have created a quagmire of case law that is replete with exceptions. 
For example, in evaluating the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions to General Manuel Noriega, a court noted that although 
most international treaties have been found to be non-self-executing, 
this determination must be made for each treaty individually.100 
Finding the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
 
 95. The fact that certain negotiations, such as whether women are to have equal rights in a 
rebuilt Iraq, take place does not detract from the offensiveness of such a discussion. If certain 
“truths” (rights) are “self-evident,” as the Declaration of Independence declares, then human 
understanding, rather than the nature of the rights themselves, changes. 
 96. Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C. 1958) (concluding, as a matter of 
law, that no cause of action was available under the U.N. Charter for damage caused by atomic 
tests conducted by the United States in the Pacific Ocean). 
 97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. I, para. 1, adopted Dec. 19, 
1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 98. See, e.g., Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that even 
though such treaties are non-self-executing, they have been employed in determining whether 
individual rights have been violated), rev’d sub nom. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 
2003); Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassini, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that 
neither the ICCPR nor the Convention Against Torture are self-executing treaties). 
 99. Hawkins, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1257; see also Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and 
International Human Rights, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 145, 149 
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (noting that courts have generally construed human rights 
treaties narrowly, and suggesting that “human rights clauses are non-self-executing and hence 
not the source of enforceable rights”). 
 100. United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
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Prisoners of War (Geneva III)101 to be self-executing, the court stated 
that “it is inconsistent with both the language and spirit of the treaty . 
. . to find that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the 
individual POW in a court of law.”102 Relying on the purpose of the 
Geneva Conventions to justify its conclusion, the court held that it 
was not designed “to create some amorphous, unenforceable code of 
honor among the signatory nations.”103 Thus, the court held, “if a 
treaty expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action, it is 
self-executing and can be invoked by the individual.”104 Such a 
torturous route to discerning individual rights from a treaty is helpful 
neither to individuals seeking protection under U.S. law nor to those 
burdened with the laws’ enforcement. 
Rather than relying on a structural analysis of whether a treaty is 
self-executing, courts should use the content, substance, and purpose 
of the treaty to determine whether treaties confer private, individual 
rights. Human rights treaties are prime contenders for conferring 
private rights based on their content and purpose because “[h]uman 
rights conventions address the rights of individuals” by their very 
nature.105 This proposal is not unprecedented: as the Noriega court 
noted, “[i]t must not be forgotten that the [Geneva] Conventions 
have been drawn up first and foremost to protect individuals.”106 
Categorically distinguishing human rights conventions and other 
international agreements is not too great a task for the judiciary. 
Traditionally, of course, the subjects of international law have been 
states—and only states.107 But treaties and other international 
instruments have moved beyond the limited subject matter that the 
Framers envisioned, such as trade agreements, military or strategic 
 
 101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. Chief Justice Marshall’s point in Foster was the reverse, that only if a treaty is self-
executing does it create individual rights. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 105. Elizabeth L. Larson, Comment, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: 
Action for Equality, Development, and Peace (Beijing, China: September 1995), 10 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 695, 713 (1996). 
 106. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 799 (quoting INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 23 (J. Picket ed., 1960)). 
 107. The dictionary, in fact, defines “international law” as “a body of rules that control or 
affect the rights of nations in their relations with each other.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 611 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 10th ed. 2001). 
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alliances, and navigation privileges.108 “[H]uman rights law . . . 
[differs] in that it focuses on the rights of individuals . . . . Because of 
this focus on individuals, human rights law necessarily must peer into 
the domestic laws of nations and into the private spheres of life.”109 
A functional argument also supports distinguishing human rights 
instruments from other kinds of international agreements. The 
Convention Against Torture, for example, is neither legislative nor 
contractual in nature. Instead, it “codifies international law as it has 
evolved.”110 In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
believed that “the majority of the obligations to be undertaken by the 
United States pursuant to the Convention [were] already covered by 
existing law.”111 Therefore, the Convention Against Torture must 
have been ratified for reasons other than to create either contractual 
obligations or new legislation, such as to support public policy. For 
example, failure to comply with either human rights treaties or 
international law norms would weaken the ability of the United 
States to impose such norms on other nations.112 Ratifying a treaty 
like the Convention Against Torture also bolstered the credibility of 
the United States in the human rights arena. In hearings related to 
the ratification, one witness told Congress that “[t]he United States 
has played a leading role in the development of the major human 
rights treaties, but has declined to ratify many of them.”113 Ratifying 
the Convention Against Torture signaled that the United States 
 
 108. See TUCKER, supra note 51, at 41 (“The object of treaties is the regulation of 
intercourse with foreign nations and is external.” (quoting James Madison at the Virginia 
Convention of 1788, called to ratify the Constitution)); see also supra text accompanying note 
83. 
 109. Larson, supra note 105, at 713. 
 110. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
REPORT, supra note 37, at 3 (“The Convention codifies international law.”). 
 111. Id. at 10. Under the Convention, the United States had to establish personal 
jurisdiction for criminal prosecution purposes; this obligation required additional legislation. 
Convention Against Torture, supra note 2, art. 4; SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE REPORT, supra note 37, at 10. Later in its report, the 
Committee noted that “[a]cts of torture committed in the United States . . . would appear to 
violate criminal statutes under existing . . . law.” Id. at 18. 
 112. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (highlighting policy 
reasons for honoring international human rights obligations), rev’d sub nom. Beharry v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 113. Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra 
note 40, at 45 (reprinting the statement of Winston Nagan, chairman, board of directors, 
Amnesty International); see also id. at 77 (reprinting the written statement of nonprofit 
organizations stating their belief that “ratification of the Convention Against Torture would 
send an important signal to the world about U.S. concern for human rights”). 
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would “practice what it preached.” The signal communicated by 
completion of the formal ratification process was especially strong 
given the many issues and causes that compete for congressional 
attention. A purely symbolic gesture, a court might reason, would not 
have been undertaken by either the president or members of 
Congress, given the demands on their time. Therefore, the signaling 
function might also serve to notify the judiciary that the political 
branches intended that the government be held accountable for 
violations of the torture prohibition, as embodied in the treaty. 
B. Human Rights as Fundamental or Constitutional Rights 
Distinguishing human rights treaties from other types of treaties 
is also consistent with both historic and modern notions of “rights.” 
Arguing that the treaty power granted to the political branches under 
the proposed Constitution was similar in its scope and limitations to 
that held by the British Crown, Patrick Henry asked rhetorically, 
“Can the English monarch make a treaty which [would] subvert the 
common law of England, and the constitution? . . . Dare he do 
anything . . . subversive of the great privileges[] of his people?” He 
then answered himself, “No, sir. If he did, it would be nugatory, and 
the attempt would endanger his existence.”114 As John Randolph 
Tucker, a nineteenth-century law professor and member of Congress, 
said, “A treaty . . . cannot take away essential liberties secured by the 
Constitution to the people.”115 
Merely because a treaty may not detract from an “essential 
liberty,” however, does not mean that human rights treaties confer 
fundamental rights. Yet such an argument makes sense.116 After all, 
human rights derive from the same source as constitutional rights117—
they are a necessary precondition to a government of free people, by 
free people, for free people. Like such judicially recognized 
 
 114. TUCKER, supra note 51, at 36 (quoting Patrick Henry at the Virginia Ratification 
Convention). 
 115. Id. at 14. 
 116. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[I]nternational law 
confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments.”). 
 117. See Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as “Rights,” 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 
434 (1979) (“International human rights derive . . . from national rights theories and systems, 
harking back through English, American, and French constitutionalism to John Locke . . . and 
earlier natural rights . . . theory.”). 
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constitutional rights as marriage and procreation,118 human rights 
need not be explicitly enumerated. If human rights treaties merely 
codify, rather than legislate, human rights derived from such treaties 
must be at least as judicially cognizable as nonenumerated 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, jus cogens norms ought to be 
recognized as a superior kind of right; it is logically inconceivable that 
a court would protect the right to marry but turn a blind eye to more 
fundamental threats to life and liberty, such as torture.119 
Additionally, a ratified treaty can be said to embody the 
sovereign will of the United States. But such sovereignty “reside[s] in 
the people, for whom the President and the Senate [are] merely 
agents.”120 At a minimum, then, human rights treaties should be able 
to add to the rights and liberties enjoyed by Americans, similar to the 
way in which other kinds of constitutive documents create obligations 
and privileges. Rights deemed to be fundamental, of course, include 
not only limitations prohibiting certain government actions but also 
positive government obligations.121 
Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance, until the 1920s, to protect 
civil liberties, and its current bent toward strict constructionism, it is 
not surprising that the Court has failed to find many positive 
obligations created by international human rights agreements.122 But 
the Court’s reluctance to do so, and the slow development of 
domestic human rights jurisprudence generally, does not mean that 
the Court should, or will, turn a blind eye to human rights claims in 
the future—especially when such claims arise from treaties.123 States 
may be the actors that draft and ratify human rights agreements, but 
 
 118. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to marry); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recognizing the right to use 
contraception). 
 119. Although slavery, also prohibited as a jus cogens norm, was embedded in, and perhaps 
even essential to the ratification of, the Constitution, the fact that the Framers failed to 
completely embody the ideals they drew upon in shaping a new country’s government should 
not be used to justify violating an analogous norm two hundred years later. 
 120. See Caleb Nelson, The Treaty Power and Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor 
Woolhandler’s Article, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 801, 807 (2002) (discussing whether unauthorized 
treaties can be self-executing). 
 121. See Henkin, supra note 117, at 434 (discussing notions and kinds of fundamental rights). 
 122. See Norman Dorsen, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 99, at 134, 144 (noting that the Supreme Court did not 
protect civil liberties until the 1920s, and arguing that the Court has still not dealt with those 
issues in the context of foreign affairs). 
 123. See id. at 140–41 (proposing three situations in which courts could guarantee civil rights 
in a foreign affairs context). 
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individuals are the intended beneficiaries.124 Indeed, most 
international human rights agreements speak in terms of individual 
rights. For example, the ICCPR uses phrases like, “Every human 
being has the inherent right to life,” and “Everyone shall have the 
right to hold opinions without interference.”125 
Additionally, as a matter of policy, viewing international human 
rights as individual rights on par with constitutional rights “may in 
fact help make it more likely that they will be enjoyed in fact,” as 
Professor Henkin notes.126 The alternative view—denying that human 
rights are constitutional rights—may well lead society “down a road 
where Americans could lose some hard-won liberties,” especially if 
the courts automatically reject a claim based on human rights in the 
name of security and categorically deem such claims either ill-
founded or nonjusticiable.127 
Finally, as consensus has developed that at least some 
international human rights norms—jus cogens norms like torture and 
genocide—do guarantee, at a minimum, the right to be free from the 
activity prohibited, it is entirely appropriate for courts to recognize 
such rights as coequal with constitutional rights.128 In Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino,129 for example, the Court noted that “the 
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a 
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the 
judiciary to render decisions regarding it.”130 
Recognizing jus cogens norms as coequal with constitutional 
rights would also be consistent with existing jurisprudence. Further, 
such recognition would not run afoul of the Court’s concerns that it 
would be infringing on the political branches’ spheres of influence.131 
A bright-line test that recognized jus cogens norms as fundamental, 
 
 124. See Henkin, supra note 117, at 431 (discussing the rights and obligations created under 
international human rights agreements). 
 125. ICCPR, supra note 97, arts. 6(1), 19(1). 
 126. Henkin, supra note 117, at 445. 
 127. See Dorsen, supra note 122, at 144 (proposing reasons why the Supreme Court has not 
dealt with contentions of civil liberties violations in the context of foreign affairs). 
 128. Id. at 140–41 (suggesting situations in which courts could guarantee civil rights in a 
foreign affairs context, including procedural due process and free speech claims). 
 129. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 130. Id. at 428; see also id. (concluding that the act of state doctrine is applicable even where 
international law has been violated and that it applies to expropriation of property of aliens 
residing in the United States). 
 131. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (disclaiming that “every case or 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance”). 
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and as equivalent to constitutional rights, would not activate the 
political question doctrine because the political branches would have 
clear guidelines as to how far their power extended. The Court’s 
contention that “the less important the implications of an issue are for 
our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the 
political branches” would seem to support political-branch 
exclusivity, given the important signal proclamation of adherence to 
human rights norms sends. Yet, in this context, the government’s 
willingness to allow courts to enforce promises made by the political 
branches may send an even stronger signal.132 
Finally, treating jus cogens norms as constitutional rights could 
expand the class of individuals protected by those norms. Courts 
could feel comfortable extending the protection of the United States 
not just to American citizens but to anyone whose fundamental 
human rights are violated by an American national under the 
nationality and territorial principles. Under the nationality principle, 
“[a] state may prosecute its nationals for crimes committed anywhere 
in the world.”133 Under the territorial principle, “[e]very state [can] 
claim[] jurisdiction over crimes committed in its own territory.”134 
Although these principles originated with regard to criminal 
activities, a strong argument can be made that violations of human 
rights constitute criminal acts.135 On a purely domestic level, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that noncitizen residents, even if 
present on U.S. territory illegally, are entitled to some rights.136 Surely 
fundamental human rights should rank among them. 
III.  CONSTRAINING THE EXECUTIVE, EMPOWERING THE JUDICIARY 
If at least some international human rights are equivalent to 
constitutional rights under American law, and if courts are competent 
to hear cases arising under human rights treaties, to what extent can 
the president modify or terminate human rights treaties? Because of 
 
 132. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
 133. MALANCZUK, supra note 52, at 111. 
 134. Id. at 110–11. 
 135. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal prosecuted Nazis for “crimes against humanity,” 
which included enslavement, torture and genocide. See, e.g., id. at 356–61 (describing human 
rights prosecutions in general, the Nuremberg Tribunals, and the emergence of the new 
International Criminal Court). 
 136. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 223 (1982) (recognizing that even illegal 
aliens are guaranteed due process and cannot be treated as a suspect class), discussed in ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746–47 (2d ed. 2002). 
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the unique nature of human rights treaties, the executive branch lacks 
the power to violate or abrogate them. Courts, therefore, when 
confronted with such an attempt, should not feel constrained by the 
political question doctrine but rather should step forward to protect 
individual rights. Further, courts should construe treaty 
interpretations or modifications as unconstitutional when inconsistent 
with binding international law. Under this theory, the president 
cannot unilaterally abrogate a human rights treaty or, at most, can 
only abrogate those treaties not dealing with jus cogens norms. Nor 
can the executive promulgate an interpretation of a treaty that is 
inconsistent with international law. In other words, human rights and 
related treaties can constrain the executive and empower the 
judiciary. 
A. Limitations on the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Powers 
This Section contends that the president is not solely responsible 
for international affairs, suggests some limitations on the president’s 
ability to interpret and execute treaties, and shows that the president 
lacks the power to abrogate human rights treaties codifying jus cogens 
norms. 
1. The President Is Not Solely Responsible for International 
Affairs.  Although the Constitution can be read as vesting the 
president with “primary constitutional authority over the conduct of 
foreign affairs,”137 the president is not the “sole organ” of foreign 
affairs and does not wield a “blank check in the area.”138 True, the 
president might be viewed as the center of power for actions touching 
on “relations and intercourse with other countries,”139 but human 
rights treaties, because they confer individual rights, do not implicate 
“intercourse” with other nations. 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.140 is commonly cited 
as supporting the theory of presidential dominance in foreign 
 
 137. H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive 
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529 (1999). 
 138. See DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES 
93 (1986) (arguing that the Framers did not vest the president with the exclusive power to make 
treaties). 
 139. Powell, supra note 137, at 555 (quoting MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)). 
 140. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
042706 03__GOLDMAN.DOC 5/23/2006  8:44 AM 
634 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:609 
affairs.141 The Court commented there that “the President alone has 
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation” and 
referred to the president’s “exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international relations.”142 Yet, 
Curtiss-Wright dealt with whether Congress could delegate authority 
to the president to prohibit munitions sales to certain countries, not 
with treaty modification or abrogation.143 Of the several categories 
into which foreign affairs powers can be divided, Curtiss-Wright most 
obviously implicates the recognition and international advocacy 
powers.144 Conceptually, the arms sales policy was either related to 
recognition of governments involved in the Paraguayan-Bolivian war 
or was part of the United States’ overall foreign policy objectives.145 
2. Limitations on the President’s Ability to Interpret and Execute 
Treaties.  Still, the president’s foreign relations powers surely include 
those of negotiating and executing treaties, which necessarily involve 
some interpretation.146 Nevertheless, the treaty power has never been 
understood to be unlimited. Hamilton believed that both the 
Constitution and “natural principles” limited the treaty power—as 
they did for every other delegated power.147 Indeed, regardless of the 
executive’s views on the subject, a congressional act that modifies, 
contravenes, or repeals a treaty following its entry into force is 
controlling.148 In Whitney v. Robertson,149 for example, the Supreme 
Court held that a commercial treaty is equivalent to any other statute 
 
 141. See id. at 316–19 (discussing the domestic and foreign powers of the political branches). 
 142. Id. at 319–20. 
 143. Id. at 322–27. 
 144. See Powell, supra note 137, at 555, 556, 564 (suggesting the division of the president’s 
foreign affairs powers into the powers of recognition, negotiation, treaty-making, international 
advocacy, and national security). 
 145. See SANDRA BAO ET AL., LONELY PLANET, ARGENTINA, URUGUAY & PARAGUAY 
664 (4th ed. 2002) (providing a brief history of the Chaco War and suggesting the involvement 
of oil companies to secure exploration rights in South America). 
 146. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Legislative Provision Regarding ABM Treaty, 20 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 246, 248 (1996) (“It belongs exclusively to the President to interpret and execute 
treaties. This is a direct corollary of his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care’ that the laws 
are faithfully executed.”). 
 147. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy 
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1092 (1985) (describing Hamilton’s view on the 
limits of the treaty power). 
 148. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) (“The duty of the courts is to 
construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will.”). 
 149. 124 U.S. 190 (1888). 
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and applied the maxim of lex posterior derogat priori—a later statute 
repeals an earlier one.150 Although the executive’s interpretation of a 
treaty carries great weight, it certainly is not controlling151 because 
Congress can check the executive branch’s interpretation through 
legislative action. Likewise, the judicial branch should be able to 
gainsay the executive’s interpretation of a treaty, especially if 
constitutional-level rights, such as human rights, are infringed.152 Put 
another way, if the executive “cannot make a treaty contrary to the 
constitution,” neither should it be able to interpret a treaty in a way 
that opposes the Constitution or that “take[s] away essential 
liberties.”153 
3. Checking the Power to Abrogate Treaties.  If the executive 
cannot “interpret away” individual rights, could it simply abrogate or 
terminate a human rights treaty? The issue of unilateral treaty 
termination by the president has never been satisfactorily resolved, 
but it has occupied the attention of many legal scholars.154 Unilateral 
termination has sometimes been justified under the theory that it 
does not create any obligations for the United States but merely 
brings obligations to an end.155 Yet estoppel might be raised as an 
argument against unilateral termination with regard to those treaties 
that implicate contractual rights.156 Similarly, human rights treaties, 
 
 150. See id. at 194 (applying the principle without articulating it in exactly the same terms). 
 151. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913) (“A construction of a treaty by the 
political department of the Government, while not conclusive upon a court . . . is nevertheless of 
much weight.”). But cf. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (accepting the 
argument that a controlling executive act preempts existing customary international law). 
 152. The executive branch, of course, can balance such judicial power by controlling judicial 
appointments, with the help of the Senate. Congress may be able to protect against excessive 
judicial aggrandizement through the impeachment process. 
 153. TUCKER, supra note 51, at 14, 37 (quoting George Mason and John Randolph Tucker, 
respectively, on the limits of the treaty power as extrapolated from similar limits on the British 
Crown). 
 154. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International 
Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CAL. L. REV. 643, 658, 660 (1937) (noting a 
long-standing controversy over the issue of unilateral treaty termination, and concluding that 
the “logical view” is that treaty termination should be accomplished in the same way that 
treaties are made). 
 155. See id. at 662 (arguing that treaty denunciation is indistinguishable from any other 
unilateral acts the president legally commits, such as “recognition of new states and 
governments”). 
 156. Cf. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 251 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The Court frustrates settled expectations by rewriting the [congressionally approved] 
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which create expectations of individual liberties or freedoms, might 
also be subject to an estoppel-style argument. 
Even the executive branch has, on at least one occasion, adhered 
to the belief that once rights are created and vest, a president does 
not have the authority to revoke them. In an opinion on the subject of 
whether an act “within the jurisdiction of the President” could be 
revised by a successor, Attorney General Caleb Cushing concluded 
that President Franklin Pierce did not have “lawful authority to 
revoke the act of . . . President Polk.”157 Cushing based his decision on 
the principle that if the opposite were true, “there would be no 
stability or security for any rights.”158 The “rights” in question related 
to a property grant that the government sought to revoke and 
reassign to a different party. If property rights acquired under color of 
law cannot be revoked, then recognized human rights, which arguably 
are more fundamental for “stability,” should be accorded similar, if 
not greater, protection.159 
Although Goldwater v. Carter160 can be read as tacitly approving 
unilateral termination, its application is limited. The Court relied on 
the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the case’s merits,161 
but under the approach outlined in this Note, the Court could have 
concluded that termination of only certain types of treaties presented 
a nonjusticiable question. Instead, members of the Court declared 
that no “judicially manageable” standards existed because “different 
termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties.”162 
The one Justice who would have reached the merits implied that the 
president did have unilateral abrogation power—but hinted that such 
 
Compact [between Oklahoma and New Mexico] to mean something other than what its 
language says.”). 
 157. Power of the President, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 606 (1854). 
 158. Id. 
 159. This example is not intended as an authoritative statement about whether a former 
president’s actions can bind a sitting president. 
 160. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 161. Id. at 1003–04 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and 
Stevens, J.). 
 162. Id. In this sense, these Justices affirmed the lower court’s statement that “[t]here is no 
judicially ascertainable . . . method of making any distinction among treaties on the basis of their 
substance. . . . [and] no standards to apply in making such distinctions.” Goldwater v. Carter, 
617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated by 444 U.S. at 996. 
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power might have been limited (or limitable, if the Court had dared 
to act) to certain categories of treaties.163 
To date, no alleged or actual unilateral terminations have dealt 
with a human rights treaty. Of the nine examples of unilateral 
presidential terminations cited by one scholar, all but one dealt with 
commerce-related issues; the other related to national defense.164 
Thus, neither judicial nor executive branch precedent, construed even 
on the most generous terms, supports unilateral termination of 
human rights treaties. 
B. How Activist Courts Can Protect Human Rights 
So, if treaties can be classified by subject, at least to the extent 
that human rights treaties can be distinguished from others as to 
overcome the political question hurdle, and if such treaties confer 
individual rights that are coequal with constitutional rights, why is the 
Court hesitant to restrain the executive? The Court may be hesitant 
to intervene, not because there is no manageable standard by which 
to classify treaties, but because the president asserts executive 
authority to terminate a treaty unilaterally—for example, by claiming 
executive branch responsibility for national security.165 Yet, as 
Professor Glennon wrote, the Court has never explicitly upheld the 
 
 163. See 444 U.S. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Abrogation of the defense treaty 
with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government . . . . 
Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to 
recognize . . . foreign regimes.”). But see GLENNON, supra note 13, at 150, 158 (arguing that 
there is no reason why termination of a mutual defense treaty should be treated differently from 
another kind of treaty, but suggesting that some treaties may not be terminable, such as the 
U.N. Charter). 
 164. See ADLER, supra note 138, at 181–90 (delineating treaties claimed to have been 
unilaterally terminated by the president). Since Professor Adler’s book was published, one 
other appellate case dealing with unilateral treaty termination might be added to the tally: 
President George W. Bush’s unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty. The challenge 
brought by several members of Congress to protest the decision resulted in another court 
“decision” rendering the issue nonjusticiable, relying on Goldwater. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (describing the ABM treaty as involving “national defense 
considerations”); see also Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1199 (D. Mass. 
1986) (finding a challenge to an embargo imposed by the president on trade with Nicaragua 
nonjusticiable based on Goldwater, but emphasizing that adjudication would be helpful to 
determine what redress, if any, injured private individuals have when a treaty is terminated). 
 165. See Powell, supra note 137, at 555, 556, 564 (outlining and describing the five general 
categories of presidential powers, including national security). 
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president’s right to terminate a treaty “on the basis of his sole 
judgment” that a treaty no longer serves a national security interest.166 
Perhaps, then, the Court wants to avoid a mere difference of 
opinion. One of the justifications for the Bush administration’s 
strained definition of torture was that there was no international 
consensus regarding the degree of suffering required to constitute 
torture.167 But, if the Convention merely codified international law 
and neither defined the offense nor legislated its prohibition, the 
Court surely would be able to ascertain some definition of what 
constitutes torture. After all, one Justice famously remarked, 
regarding obscenity, that he knew it when he saw it; surely torture, 
however difficult to define, is equally recognizable in the majority of 
cases.168 And, if the Bush administration’s definition conflicted with 
the commonly understood definition of torture, construing a human 
rights treaty as vesting individual rights would provide the Court with 
a clear rationale for rejecting the administration’s definition. As the 
arbiter of the meaning of constitutional rights, the judicial branch, 
and not the executive, should bear responsibility for, and assert 
authority over, the interpretation of human rights treaties.169 
The Bush administration also claimed that a defense of 
“necessity” justified contravening not just the Convention Against 
Torture, but also relevant domestic legislation.170 But the Convention 
itself indicates that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . . 
may be invoked as a justification of torture.”171 The Court should feel 
empowered to rely on the status of torture as a jus cogens norm and 
 
 166. GLENNON, supra note 13, at 149. 
 167. See Standards of Conduct for Interrogation, supra note 3, at 19–20 (citing Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Mark Richard’s testimony at the Senate ratification hearing on the 
Convention Against Torture that no such consensus existed). 
 168. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 169. Although the federal torture statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2004), 
criminalizes torture only outside the United States, the Convention Against Torture cannot be 
reasonably understood to permit torture committed by a government against its own people. If 
a human rights treaty is to mean anything, especially in the context of vesting constitutional 
rights, it must be understood as conferring protections domestically at least as great as those 
granted to individuals residing outside U.S. territory. Compare Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 
33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that there are no reported cases recognizing a 
cause of action under any jus cogens norm for acts committed by U.S. government officials 
against U.S. citizens), with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that 
the court knows of “no assertion by any contemporary state of a right to torture its own . . . 
citizens”). 
 170. Standards of Conduct for Interrogation, supra note 3, at 39. 
 171. Convention Against Torture, supra note 2, art. 2(2). 
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to reject any definition that derogates from it, even one proposed by 
the executive, to the degree required to protect such a norm’s 
“penumbras and emanations.”172 The Court would be acting 
consistently with its own precedent and could neatly avoid the 
political question doctrine by pointing to controlling authority, such 
as treaties, customs, and other sources of international law, giving it 
the kind of judicially manageable standard found lacking in 
Goldwater. Such an approach would give the Court a legitimate 
reason to supersede either political branch’s opinion while 
simultaneously avoiding accusations of ideological or political bias. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has opted for none of these 
approaches to date. In 2004, in fact, it declined to interpret and apply 
international human rights law, accepting the Senate’s declaration 
that the ICCPR is non-self-executing and therefore does not confer 
any individual rights.173 Fortunately, the Court did not entirely close 
the door to such an approach. It merely insisted that “any claim based 
on the present-day law of nations . . . rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of . . . 18th-century 
paradigms”174 and noted that “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant 
doorkeeping”175 and “independent judicial recognition of actionable 
international norms.”176 
A decision that human rights treaties, because of their unique 
nature and function, should be treated differently from other treaties, 
and specifically that jus cogens norms deserve special status, would 
allow the Court to constrain the executive without raising the fear of 
an out-of-control judiciary. 
CONCLUSION 
Understandings of both treaties and rights have evolved since the 
United States was founded. Foreign relations is indisputably more 
complex than it was in the eighteenth century; as a result, the nature 
 
 172. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, art. 53; see Lobel, supra note 
147, at 1138 (explaining Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the 
United States accepts as binding even though it has not been ratified). 
 173. Sosa v. Alvarez-Martin, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). 
 174. Id. at 725. 
 175. Id. at 729. 
 176. Id. But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[C]ourts must 
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists . . . today.”). 
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and purposes of treaties have changed. Similarly, conceptions of 
sovereignty have changed, and notions about individual rights, so 
revolutionary when asserted in the Declaration of Independence, 
have become established and have expanded to encompass areas of 
human activity the Framers would never have anticipated. And 
although positivists can question whether states practice what they 
preach, at least normatively, certain practices are no longer accepted, 
such as slavery, genocide, and apartheid. Such developments are 
unquestionably “advances.” 
In a world in which a U.S. president might assert the need for 
extraordinary powers to face new and uncertain threats to domestic 
tranquility and national security, the Supreme Court should rely more 
heavily on international law than it has in the past to restrain further 
aggrandizement of presidential power. Doing so would be entirely 
consistent with judicial precedent because international law has 
always been part of American law. Nor should the Court fear to look 
beyond written texts to discern the content and scope of international 
law. Treaties often neither define nor create the law, especially when 
such treaties deal with human rights and behavioral norms about 
which consensus has already been achieved. 
When a clear standard exists for adjudicating deviations from 
international norms or treaty obligations, the Court should not throw 
its hands up and seek refuge under the shelter of the political 
question doctrine. Quite the contrary. After all, in Chief Justice 
Marshall’s words, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”177 Faced with such a case, 
the Court should step in to contravene presidential action contrary to 
a peremptory norm. 
 
 177. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
